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Sandra G. Leggat* The Impact of the Purchaser
Gaetan S. Tardif** Provider Funding Model in the
United Kingdom on the
Independence of Persons with
Disabilities: Implications for the
Canadian Health Care System
Through large-scale system restructuring, a number of jurisdictions around the
world have adopted a purchaserprovider approach to the funding and delivery of
health care services. In this model, a decision-making body, such as a regional
board, is provided with a budget to purchase health care services on behalf of, and
in response to the identified needs of a defined population. This paper reviews the
purchaser provider funding model of the United Kingdom and comments on the
impact of this system on the health needs of individuals with disabilities.
Generally, the purchaser provider split in the U.K. appears to have resulted in
greater fragmentation and inequity in care among the disabled population. The
implications of the use of this type of funding method on individuals with
disabilities residing in Canada are then discussed in relation to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
La restructuration j grande 6chelle des systemes de sant6 a r6sult6, dans de
nombreuses juridictions, en une approche acheteur-fournisseur pour le
financement et la provision des services de sant6. Avec ce module, une autorit6,
telle un regie r6gionale, regoitun budgetpourl'achatde services de sant6 au nom
d'une population definie et en r6ponse a leurs besoins identifies. Cet article fait
une revue du syst~me d'allocation de ressources acheteur-foumisseur en place
au Royaume-Uni et commente sur I'impact de ce systeme sur les besoins de
sante des personnes handicapdes. En general, la s6paration acheteur-fournisseur
au Royaume-Uni semble avoir r6sult6 en une fragmentation accrue et une
iniquit6 de soins parmi lespersonnes handicapees. Les implications de l'utilisation
de cette methode de financement pour les canadiens atteints d'une incapacite
sont par la suite discut6es en relation de la Charte canadienne des droits et
libert6s.
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Introduction
Throughout history, people with disabilities have faced physical, sys-
temic and attitudinal barriers not experienced by non-disabled members
of the population in gaining access to health care. The purpose of this
paper is to focus specifically on the impact of the implementation of a
purchaser provider model of health care planning and delivery on the
access of the disabled population to health care services.
Through large-scale system restructuring, a number of jurisdictions
around the world have adopted a purchaser provider approach to the
funding and delivery of health care services. In this model, a decision-
making body, such as a regional board, is provided with a budget to
purchase health care services on behalf of and in response to the identified
needs of a defined population. It has been suggested that through the
market competition which is thereby created, the purchaser provider
model promotes greater accountability within the health care system,
redistributes power from health care providers to health care consumers,
and facilitates the achievement of cost efficiencies.' Conversely, pur-
chaser provider systems have been described as elaborate mechanisms to
co-opt the public into rationing of health care services. 2 Rationing of
health care is perceived as being culturally unacceptable and politically
dangerous in many jurisdictions, as it has the potential to create inequity
in access to health care. In a system with a purchaser provider split, the
purchasing authorities may meet the expenditure targets assigned by the
provincial government through service rationing, at arms length from the
government. Other authors have suggested that splitting purchaser from
provider increases transactional costs required for negotiating and moni-
toring contracts within the system with limited operational benefits.'
Although there is debate about the real and potential impacts of a
purchaser provider system of health care planning and delivery, there has
been no comprehensive evaluation of this method of organizing a health
care system. Yet, more jurisdictions restructure their health care systems
with market competition as an ostensible underlying principle. For
example, in Canada, the province of Ontario recently established a
purchaser provider split for community-based and long-term care ser-
1. See C. Ham, "Managed markets in health care: the U.K. experiment" (1996) 35 Health
Policy 279.
2. See S. Harrison & G. Wistow,"The purchaser/provider split in English health care: towards
explicit rationing?" (1992) 20 Policy & Politics 123.
3. See P. Howden-Chapman & T. Ashton, "Shopping for health: purchasing health services
through contracts" (1994) 29 Health Policy 61.
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vices. This model introduces competitive bidding for services for a
vulnerable sector of the population who require in-home and long-term
care services. Its introduction presumes that competition will enable
quality health care to be provided for this population at lower cost to the
system. However, the focus on cost reduction in competitive bidding may
result in inequitable access to health care by vulnerable and marginalized
segments of the population.
A purchaser provider system has been in place in the United Kingdom
(U.K.) since 1990. This paper will review the purchaser provider health
system in the U.K. and analyze its impact on persons with disabilities
receiving health care. Generally,the analysis will suggest that implemen-
tation of a purchaser provider split in health care has the potential to create
significant inequities in access to health care services among individuals
with chronic and disabling conditions.
I. The Definition of Disability
Before the rise of organized medicine in the 19th century, legal authori-
ties carried responsibility for judging who could be classified as dis-
abled.4 As the medical profession advanced, based on principles of
scientific objectivity, physicians became the authority to pronounce on
disease and disability. Individuals with disabilities comprise a vulner-
able, but growing sector of society and there is often still a need for a legal
definition of disability or handicap. The World Health Organization
(WHO) defines disability as "any restriction or lack (resulting from an
impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the
range considered normal for a human being."' This definition of disabil-
ity is used in many areas. For example, Statistics Canada uses this
definition in the Health and Activities Limitation Survey (HALS), a post-
censual survey in which individuals identify their limitations in activities
of daily living. The WHO definition of disability is considered by many
to reflect a medical perspective that suggests there is a normal state and
deviations from normal are abnormal. Use of a definition of disability that
is based on a normal/abnormal distinction has been challenged because
what is considered normal may change depending on the culture, time
period or perspective used by the observer .6 Normal and abnormal are not
4. See J. Craddock, "Responses of the Occupational Therapy Profession to the Perspective of
the Disability Movement, Part I" (1996) 59 Br. J. Occupational Therapy 17.
5. World Health Organization International Classifications of Impairments, Disabilities and
Handicaps (World Health Organization, 1980) 143.
6. See e.g., 1. Illich et al., Disabling Professions (London: M. Boyers, 1977).
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objective measures. However, it is this perspective that is taken in the
Ontario Human Rights Code, where section 10(1) of the Code provides:
"because of handicap" means for the reason that the person has or
has had, or is believed to have had,
a. any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation
or disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect
or illness and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
including diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, any degree of paralysis,
amputation, lack of physical coordination, blindness or visual
impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or
speech impediment, or physical reliance on a dog guide or on
a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device,
b. a condition of mental retardation or impairment,
c. a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the
processes involved in understanding or using symbols or
spoken language,
d. a mental disorder, or
e. an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or
received under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Illustrating an alternate view, the Institute of Medicine in the U.S.
defines disability as "a limitation in performing certain roles and tasks
that society expects of an individual."8 This definition suggests that
disability is not inherent in the individual, but results from the interaction
between the biological and psychological make-up of the individual and
his or her environment. The extent of a disability is therefore dependent
upon the social and physical environment of the individual. This perspec-
tive is reflected in the U.S. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which defines a
handicapped individual as
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment."
Notwithstanding the Ontario Human Rights Code,'° the bio-social inter-
pretation of disability has been supported by the Supreme Court of
Canada, in Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia, where McIntyre
J. stated that the "accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
7. R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19.
8. E.N. Brandt & A.M. Pope, eds., Enabling America. Assessing the Role of Rehabilitation
Science and Engineering (Washington: National Academy Press, 1997) S-5.
9. 29 U.S.C.A. §706 (West 1985).
10. R.S.O. 1990,c. H.19.
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equality"'"I and in Eaton v. Brant Board of Education, where "it is the
failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune society so that its
structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and banishment
of disabled persons from participation, which results in discrimination
against them."2 These judgements provide support for a bio-social view
of disability over the medically-based normal/abnormal perspective.
In law, mental disability has been identified in statutes and in the
Constitution as distinct from physical disability. 3 Within the health care
sector, definitions of disability have generally been ambiguous for
political reasons, often related to service funding . Typically, emotional
and cognitive impairments resulting in disability are considered sepa-
rately from physical disability based on the medical perspective of the
duality of mind and body. 5 Mental health is organized and funded
separately from physical health within the health care system. For this
reason, the analysis in this paper is limited to individuals with physical
disability, although it would be surprising if the experience of people with
mental disabilities were markedly different.
With developing medical technology, more people with disabilities
are surviving with more severe impairments, for much longer life spans .
The effectiveness and appropriateness of any health care system change
in meeting population needs will be reflected through the impact on the
disabled population. A number of authors have stressed that a test of the
adequacy of a health care system is its ability to maintain the vital margin
of health of individuals with disabilities."' This group is more vulnerable
to health problems than persons in the general population and mainte-
nance of their health has importance in ensuring their quality of life within
the society in which they live. In addition, a focus on the health of the
disabled population has financial implications, in that the overall costs of
care may be reduced. The analysis in this paper will address three areas
of importance: equalization of opportunities for the disabled population
11. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 169, 56 D.L.R.
(4th) l.
12. Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, (1997) 142 D.L.R. (4th) 385 at 406
[hereinafter Eaton].
13. Battlefords District Co-operative Ltd. v. Gibbs, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566 [hereinafter Gibbs].
14. D.M. Fox, "Policy and Epidemiology: Financing Health Services for the Chronically Ill
and Disabled, 1930-1990" (1989) 67 Milbank Q. (Supp. 2, Pt. 2) 257.
15. P. Roberts, "Theoretical Models of Physiotherapy" (1994) 80 Physiotherapy 361.
16. Craddock, supra note 4.
17. See A.I. Batavia et al., "The primary medical needs of people with disabilities" (1988) 14
Am. Rehabilitation 9 and G. DeJong, A.I. Batavia & R. Griss, "America's Neglected Health
Minority: Working-age Persons with Disabilities" (1989) 67 Milbank Q. (Supp. 2, pt. 2) 311
at 320.
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addressed both by decree of the United Nations and through national
legislation preventing discrimination against people with disabilities, the
primordial importance of an integrated system for individuals suffering
from chronic or disabling conditions, and the impact of existing financial
constraints within the health care system on the evolution of the purchaser
provider model.
Four possible mechanisms for purchasing of health services for
disabled people were identified in the literature:
1) a budget is provided to a care manager to purchase on behalf of
the individuals;
2) a budget is held by a region and practitioners apply to the region
for reimbursement for services provided;
3) the budget is used by the region to fund services directly through
mechanisms such as block grants to providers; or
4) the budget is distributed to the service users for them to purchase
their own care.18
Although all of these purchasing mechanisms have been tried to some
extent, the most common approach within the purchaser provider models
implemented to date involves purchasing by a regional health authority
through contracts or grants to providers. A purchaser provider system
structured around service users obtaining the funds and purchasing their
services directly or in association with a care manager might have
resulted in different outcomes from those discussed in this paper. How-
ever, few jurisdictions are likely to give up control of the purchasing
budget to individual consumers. Government funders and service provid-
ers maintain professional control of assessment and care purchasing, and
management for control of finances, but also because the medical model
suggests that persons with disabilities are dependent, requiring care. 9
II. The Purchaser Provider Model in the United Kingdom
The National Health Service (NHS) was created in the U.K. in 1948,2"
with the result that all public and voluntary hospitals were transferred to
direct control of the central government. Funding of the system is through
general taxation (81%), payroll taxes (14%) and user charges (4%). Like
Canada, the NHS maintains a long standing separation between primary
18. A. Petch, J. Cheltham, R.Fuller et al., Delivering Community Care Initial Implementation
of Care Management in Scotland (Edinburgh: The Stationery Office, 1996).
19. See e.g. A. Kestenbaum, Independent Living. A Review (Layerthorpe: York Publishing
Services, 1996) at 4.
20. National Health Service Act 1946 (U.K.), c. 81.
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physician care and secondary hospital care. In 1962, the NHS planned
hospital development around district general hospitals, directly con-
trolled by the government, serving one hundred to one hundred and fifty
thousand people. In 1990, the NHS had undergone a series of reforms that
resulted in health authorities and general practitioner fundholders carry-
ing responsibility for purchasing health services from hospital and
community trusts.2 The Government announced that "to include greater
flexibility and the more effective matching of patient needs and care,
decision making was to be delegated to the local level". 22 The NHS
contracts between purchasers and the health care providers are manage-
ment documents that specify the cost, quality and quantity of service
purchased. These contracts are 'understandings' among the participants,
rather than contracts enforceable by law.23 Critics of the NHS reforms
have suggested that the changes are leading to commercialization and
privatization of health service provision within the U.K., as the purchas-
ers can purchase from both public and private providers.
From 1988 to 1993, individuals with disabilities could apply to the
Independent Living Fund (ILF) for funding to purchase their own
personal assistance services. The original ILF was then replaced by a
Fund which was much smaller in scope and had greater criteria which had
to be met for support. The 1990 National Health Service and Community
Care Act gave local authorities the funding responsibility for community
care services. Critics have suggested that the Act eliminated the opportu-
nity for people with disabilities to control their own lives by increasing
their dependency on others to plan, purchase and evaluate needed
community services.24 In 1991, responsibility for wheelchair services
was also devolved to the district level within the NHS, with each regional
authority independently planning and purchasing wheelchairs and other
assistive technology.
As part of the 1990 U.K. reforms, the Patient's Charter25 was
introduced to stress the priority of the health needs of the population. The
Secretary of State for Health in the U.K. continues to stress that "patients
must always come first."2 6 The Charter sets out the rights (which all
21. National Health Service and Commnunity Care Act 1990 (U.K.), 1990, c. 19.
22. A. Maynard, "Can competition enhance efficiency in health care? Lessons from the
reform of the U.K. National Health Service" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1433 at 1437.
23. (U.K.), 1990, c. 19, s. 4(3).
24. V. Finklestein & 0. Stuart, "Developing new services" in G. Hales, ed., Beyond
disability: towards an enabling society (London: Sage, 1996).
25. U.K. Dept. of Health, The Patient's Charter & You (London: NHS, 1995).
26. V. Bottomley, Secretary of State for Health, as quoted in ibid.
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patients receive all the time) and the expectations (which are standards of
service the NHS aims to achieve, but not guarantee). The Patient's
Charter 7 indicates consumers can "expect" the NHS to make it easy for
everyone to use its services, including people with physical or mental
disabilities. This suggests that individuals with special health care needs
do not have a "right," but only an "expectation" of care. However, in
1995, the U.K. passed the Disability Discrimination Act "to make it
unlawful to discriminate against disabled persons in connection with
employment, the provision of goods, facilities and services or the
disposal or management of premises ...." This Act may elevate health
and social service care from an "expectation" to a "right" for people with
disabilities, as the Act specifies. 9
19. (1) It is unlawful for a provider of services to discriminate
against a disabled person -
(a) in refusing to provide, or deliberately not providing, to the
disabled person any service which he provides, or is prepared
to provide, to members of the public;
(b) in failing to comply with any duty imposed upon him by section
21 in circumstances in which the effect of that failure is to make
it impossible or unreasonably difficult for the disabled person
to make use of any such service;
(c) in the standard of service which he provides to the disabled
person or the manner in which he provides it to him; or
(d) in the terms on which he provides a service to the disabled
person.
III. Equalization of Opportunity
In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Standard
Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities",
to ensure that they are accorded the same rights, freedoms and obligations
as other members of society. Following from the United Nations Decade
of the Disabled (1982-1993), the standard rules express strong moral and
political commitment to the equalization of opportunities for people with
disabilities. 30 Under this framework, people with disabilities should
receive the same access to health and social services as the general
population. Many jurisdictions have gone further in protecting the rights
27. Supra note 25.
28. (U.K.), 1995, c. 50.
29. Ibid.
30. M. Peat, "Attitudes and access: advancing the rights of people with disabilities" (1997)
156 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 657.
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of people with disabilities in legislation. For example, the U.S. enacted
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.31 As discussed above, the
U.K. passed the Disability Discrimination Act" in 1995. In Canada, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 3 and the Canadian Human
Rights Act 34 prohibit discrimination based on mental or physical
disability. However, this legislation does not directly address systemic
discrimination, and recently the Federal Task Force on Disability Issues
made a strong recommendation for the Government of Canada to
establish a Canadians with Disabilities Act as a complementary mea-
sure to existing human rights legislation. This Task Force stated that
"Canadians have the right to expect inclusiveness, equality and the
opportunity to achieve equal outcomes, no matter where they live."35
Based on the principle of equality of opportunity expressed above,
individuals with disabilities should have equitable access to health care.
An objective of the purchaser provider model is to transfer power
within the health care system from physicians and other providers to
consumers.36 The purchaser provider funding model is expected to
promote greater system accountability among providers. Purchase of
services in response to local needs suggests the end of provider domi-
nation in the planning and development of health care services. The
purchasers set out clear expectations by which providers can be as-
sessed, and if the contract terms are not met, the sanction is that contracts
will not be renewed. This equalization of power within the system
should be beneficial to individuals with disabilities requiring services.
However, this has not proven to be the case. Implementation of a
purchaser provider model requires the purchaser to focus on meeting the
needs of the broader population within a fixed budget. The assessment
of need by the regional authority is influenced by resource availability,
and resource levels are centrally determined and based to a large extent
on historical financial allocation.3 Although the NHS reforms stressed
31. 42U.S.C.A.§12111.
32. (U.K.), 1995,c. 50.
33. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. [hereinafter Charter].
34. R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 2.
35. Canada. Federal Task Force on Disability Issues, Equal Citizenship for Canadians with
Disabilities: The Will to Act (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services,
1996) at 12.
36. B. Salter, "The politics of purchasing in the national health service" (1993) 21 Policy &
Politics 171.
37. M. Browne, "Needs assessment and community care" in J. Percy-Smith, ed., Needs
Assessments in Public Policy (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996).
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that "to meet patients' needs, money was to follow the patient,"38 in a
regional purchasing model there is a shift in planning and service
philosophy from care for individuals to care for the community. Individu-
als with special needs become members of a larger community pool and
resources tend to be allocated to meet what is thought to be the greater
good of the community. Resource allocation within purchaser provider
systems is often based on needs assessment. Shortell et al. have stressed
the importance of an outside-in approach to needs assessment to ensure
a complete continuum of service is available to meet the needs of the
population.39 However, needs assessment techniques are only useful in
identifying relative need, in that one need is greater than another need.
Other than 'the greater the need, the greater the funding allocation', needs
assessments do not provide resource allocation rules that lead to maxi-
mizing benefits to the community given the existing resource con-
straints.40 In fact, in relation to the U.K. system, Day and Klein state that
needs assessment might prove to be a political and technical morass for
the purchasers.4 ' Needs assessments, by their nature, focus on the
greatest needs within the population and not on the special needs of
smaller constituency groups.
The existing wheelchair services in the U.K. are a clear example of lack
of equalization of opportunity. A 1994 survey found that varying regional
authorities had allocated service funding for wheelchairs to reflect very
different priorities. This survey found annual budgets for wheelchair
services ranged between 25 pounds per wheelchair user to 123 pounds per
wheelchairuser. 42 Twenty-five pounds per annum is not sufficient for the
maintenance of a single wheelchair, let alone purchase of new wheel-
chairs, and residents with disabilities served by authorities with this
allocated level of service funding would receive substantially less wheel-
chair service than individuals in other parts of the U.K. Furthermore,
health authorities adopted different systems for wheelchair assessment
and prescription, and different staffing mixes in the wheelchair centres .43
This illustrates that even within the population with disabilities in the
U.K. there is inequity in access to wheelchair resources.
38. Maynard, supra note 22 at 1437.
39. S.M. Shortell et al., Remaking Health Care in America (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1996).
40. See C. Donaldson, "Economics,public health and health care purchasing: reinventing the
wheel" (1995) 33 Health Policy 79.
41. P. Day, Accountability: Five Public Services (London: Tavistock, 1987).
42. Prosthetic and Wheelchair Committee. National Prosthetic and Wheelchair Services
Report 1993-1996. (London: College of Occupational Therapists, 1996).
43. P. Jelier & A. Turner-Smith, "Review of Wheelchair Services in England" (1997) 60 Br.
J. Occupational Therapy 150.
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Associated with the transfer of power, the purchaser provider system
might be seen to facilitate greater consumer input into the services
required. However, this would be dependent upon consumers participat-
ing or providing real input to boards and staff of the purchasing authori-
ties. In the U.K., the regional authorities comprise a maximum of eleven
members; as the executive staff of the organization is included in this
total, there are only five spaces available for non-executive members.
There is little opportunity for consumer participation on these decision-
making bodies,and even less opportunity for individuals from marginalized
groups, such as those with disabilities, to have a voice in resource
allocation. Generally, the 'politically powerful' dominate bodies respon-
sible for health care resource allocation,' and it is likely that the health
care needs identified by these participants will be very different than
those expressed by members of society who are faced with disabling
conditions. Even the 'general public' tends to put greater emphasis on
technology and acute care services and less emphasis on services for
disadvantaged populations.45 A 1994 survey of young people with
physical impairments living in Inner London revealed decreasing access
to necessary services .46
IV. Integrated Service Delivery
Individuals with chronic conditions require integrated and coordinated
care that treats chronic disease as an evolving condition, not a series of
events. "Successful chronic illness programs . .. maintain regular contact
and prevent losses to follow-up, collect critical data on health and disease
status regularly, meet educational and psychosocial needs, and respond
appropriately to clinical needs. '47 Integrated health care delivery is
important because consumers with chronic conditions tend to be the most
vulnerable in society: the frail, the elderly, and persons with physical or
cognitive disabilities. The needs of these groups for service are greatest
at a time when they may be unable to search out personally the best
44. See S. Lewis, "Regionalization and devolution: transforming health,reshaping politics?"
Paper based on a presentation to the Robarts Centre Symposium, April 1-2, 1996 [unpub-
lished].
45. See J. Lomas, Reluctant Rationers: Public Input to Health Care Priorities, Policy
Commentary C96-2 (Hamilton: McMaster University Centre for Health Economics and Policy
Analysis, 1996).
46. Y. Doyle, P. Moffatt & S. Corlett, "Coping with disabilities: the perspective of young
adults from different ethnic backgrounds in Inner London" (1994) 38 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1491.
47. E.H. Wagner, B.T. Austin & M. Von Korff, "Improving outcomes in chronic illness"
(1996) 4 Manag. Care Q. 12 at 16.
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services. The split of purchaser and provider may, in fact, result in greater
fragmentation of care to populations with long term needs. Researchers
in the U.K. have suggested that the separation between purchase and
delivery has strengthened boundaries around existing patterns of service
delivery "I making it difficult to achieve integrated service delivery. For
example, since the reforms, NHS hospitals have increased focus on the
diagnostic and treatment phases with less attention to the recuperative
and rehabilitation phases of care. 49
The existing health care system has been designed to respond to
emergency and acute episodes with highly technological services. The
structure is not well suited to individuals requiring ongoing or intermit-
tent care for chronic or disabling conditions. 0 In fact, individuals with a
chronic or disabling condition who had previously received health care
for an acute illness were astounded at the inability of the health care
system to respond to their chronic illness in the same manner.' A funding
model which strengthens these inadequacies will not provide better care
for individuals with chronic or disabling conditions. Therapy providers
in the NHS have observed greater fragmentation of care throughout the
system. 2 The purchaser provider split in the U.K. has resulted in
inconsistent provision of rehabilitation, with service users, carers, prac-
titioners and managers expressing "increasing dissatisfaction about ac-
cess to rehabilitation opportunities."53 People with disabilities in the
U.K. complain that because different purchasing patterns result in the
provision of different services, their access to rehabilitation varies
according to where they live and this is considered to be unfair 4.5 This
fragmentation of service has been shown to have an impact on the
functional independence of individuals with disabilities. A 1993 study
found that functional deterioration had been detected among individuals
subjected to fragmented care delivery, which directly affected the ability
of these individuals with disabilities to live as independently as possible
in the community .5 5 On the other hand, individuals with disabilities who
48. Ham, supra note I at 279.
49. AJ. Harrison, Hospitals in England (London: Kings Fund Policy Institute, 1997).
50. See e.g., G.H. Williams, "Disablement and the ideological crisis in health care" (1991)
32 Soc. Sci. & Med. 517.
51. S.E. Thorne, Negotiating Health Care. The Social Context of Chronic Illness (Newbury
Park: Sage Publications, 1993).
52. E. Pringle, "Occupational Therapy in the Reformed NHS: the Views of Therapists and
Therapy Managers" (1996) 59 Br. J. Occupational Therapy 401.
53. J. Robinson & G. Batstone,Rehabilitation A Developmental Challenge (London: Kings
Fund, 1996) at I.
54. Ibid. at 6.
55. M.H. Williams & C. Bowie, "Evidence of unmet need in the care of severely physically
disabled adults" (1993) 306 Br. Med. J. 95.
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experienced regular multidisciplinary contact had more of their needs
met .56
It has been suggested that separation of the purchase from the provi-
sion of health care increases accountability, as the purchaser has a duty
to set out clear criteria by which the providers will be evaluated.
However, this separation also separates the flow of feedback and evalu-
ative information which, consistent with the principles of total quality
management, is used to continually improve services. This forced sepa-
ration limits the capacity for learning57 among both the purchasers and-
providers. Research by Lomas et al.58 confirmed that clinicians were
often mistaken about their understanding of their own practice patterns,
indicating that feedback was necessary to stimulate change. Researchers
have found that a feedback loop, linking standard setting, information
gathering, and service provision is essential for improvement in clinical
practice, and that this feedback is most effective when presented close to
the time of decision making. 9 Without this feedback, the purchaser
provider system may discourage innovation in care delivery. Within the
system there may not be sufficient incentives to ensure ongoing and
integrated care of people with chronic or disabling conditions.
Individuals receiving care in the U.K. have consistently indicated that
their physicians are not able to provide them with sufficient information
on services and benefits that would assist them in achieving greater
independence in the community.' This may have been reflected in the
reported levels of satisfaction of NHS patients. Satisfaction surveys
conducted since the NHS reforms have shown that, with respect to the
care provided through GP fundholders, people with specific diseases
expressed greater satisfaction, but people with less well defined condi-
tions have become less satisfied with care .61 Individuals with ongoing but
less clear health care needs may not be well served in a system where the
purchasers and providers are not receiving the information required to
56. Williams & Bowie, ibid.
57. J. Stewart, "The limitations of government by contract" (1993) Public Money &
Management.
58. See e.g., J. Lomas et al., "Do practice guidelines guide practice? The effect of a consensus
statement on the practice of physicians" (1989) 321 New Eng. J. Med. 1306.
59. M. Mugford, P. Banfield & M. O'Hanlon,"Effects of feedback of information on clinical
practice: a review" (1991) 303 Br. Med. J. 398.
60. R.A. Chesson & A.M. Sutherland, "General practice and the provision of information and
services for physically disabled people aged 16 to 65 years" (1992) 42 Br. J. General Practice
473.
61. J.G. Howie, D.J. Heaney & M. Maxwell, "Care of patients with selected health problems
in fundholding practices in Scotland in 1990 and 1992: needs, processes and outcomes" (1995)
45 Br. J. General Practice 121.
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change practices to better meet community needs. As health care system
data becomes disaggregated in systems with a purchaser provider split,
there is a concern that information will not be available for ongoing
improvement in care delivery.
V. Financial Constraints
The experience of publicly funded health systems would suggest that the
demand for health care will exceed that of supply available within the
percentage of gross domestic product allocated to health care that is
socially acceptable to most industrialized nations. This means that there
needs to be a mechanism in place to determine how limited health care
resources will be used to meet service needs. Purchasing authorities are
responsible for identifying health care needs of the defined population,
establishing health care priorities and standards, and purchasing health
care services to meet their needs. The provider organizations are respon-
sible for the provision of services to the defined population in accordance
with the contract with the purchaser. The separation of purchaser and
provider has, in fact, created a rationing mechanism, using the purchasers
to explicitly ration health care through their purchasing patterns. The
purchasing authority has the responsibility of "targeting scarce resources
where they will achieve the most health gain for the population served. ' '62
Early indications are that this has resulted in inadequate service for people
with disabilities. Although the important role of occupational therapists
in assisting individuals with disabilities to reach their maximal functional
level has long been recognized by other workers in the health care
system,63 occupational therapists in the U.K. have expressed concern that
purchasers, GPs, and commissioners have a poor appreciation of how
occupational therapy actually contributed to quality of life. This has been
translated into insufficient occupational therapy service for the
community.64
Another objective of implementation of a purchaser provider split in
the U.K. was to increase the efficiency of the health system by creating
competition among service providers. The health authorities and GP
fundholders purchase the services required to meet the needs of the
population from a range of different providers. The intent of this compe-
tition is to encourage purchasing based on the most appropriate service,
62. Ham, supra note I at 289.
63. See Williams & Bowie, supra note 55, and F.C. Edwards & M.D. Warren, Health
Services for Adults with Physical Disabilities (London: Royal College of Physicians, 1990).
64. Pringle, supra note 52.
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for the best price. However, the purchase of health care assumes that
purchasers have good information on the required quantity of various
types of health care services that need to be purchased. A survey of
individuals with disabilities residing in the U.K. found that individuals
with similar levels of disability received very different levels of service.
For example, an individual with multiple sclerosis who was wheelchair
dependent had not been seen by her general practitioner for eight years,
while a similar individual in a different area received monthly home visits
from her general practitioner.65 It may be possible to encourage efficien-
cies in service delivery through competitive bidding. However, a larger
issue for the population with disabilities is the determination of appropri-
ate levels of service provision required to promote maximal functional
abilities. Only when the appropriate service requirements have been
determined, can the focus shift to improving the cost-efficiency of these
services.
VI. The Implications for Canadian Health Policy
Although most Canadian provinces (British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island, and Newfoundland 66 ) have adopted regionalized health
care systems, none has established a purchaser provider split. The
regional health authorities existing in Canada generally have responsibil-
ity for determining population needs, establishing regional health plans,
allocating funding, and monitoring or managing the delivery system. In
most of the provinces, the regional authority has become the direct
service planner and provider, as hospital boards have been dismantled by
the government and replaced by the regional authorities. In these struc-
tures, health care workers become employees of the region. The direct
provision of care by the region may overcome many of the identified
shortcomings in the purchaser provider model that reduce the indepen-
dence of people with disabilities. Information flow to provide the neces-
65. Chesson & Sutherland, supra note 60.
66. Regionalized systems have been created through the following enabling legislation:
British Columbia - The Health Authorities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 180; Alberta - Regional
Health Authorities Act, R.S.A. 1994, c. R-9.07; Saskatchewan - The Health Districts Act, S.S.
1993, c. H-0.01 (The Health Districts Amendment Act , S.S. 1996, c. 47); Quebec - An Act
Respecting Health Services and Social Services, R.S.Q. 1977, c. 5-4.2; New Brunswick -
Hospital Act, S.N.B. 1992, c. H-6. 1; Nova Scotia - Regional Health Boards Act, S.N.S. 1994,
c. 12; P.E.I. - Health and Community Services Act, S.P.E.I. 1993, c. 30; and Newfoundland -
The Department of Health Act, R.S .N. 1990, c. D- 15 as rep. by Executive Council Act, R.S .N.
1995, c. E-16.1, s. 23 and The Hospitals Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. H-9.
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sary feedback to both purchasers and providers of health care services can
be maintained within these regional models. However, it will be neces-
sary for the regions to ensure coordination and integration of health
services. British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Prince Edward
Island are the only provinces in which the provincial governments have
explicitly given the regional authorities the responsibility for ensuring
integrated service delivery. In those provinces where some health ser-
vices are provided through contractual arrangements between the re-
gional authorities and the providers (e.g., British Columbia and
Saskatchewan), the regional authorities will need to structure their
contracting processes to promote collaboration, and not the competition
and confrontation that resulted from the purchaser provider split in other
jurisdictions.
The majority of the Canadian provinces have structured health regions
around the institutionally-based medical care sector. By not including
primary care services, central provincial governments have limited the
ability of the health regions to ensure that they function as a comprehen-
sive health care system. The needs of people with disabilities go far
beyond hospital care, yet, the regional systems in Canada are not
structured to respond to these needs in a coordinated manner. In a large
study of individuals with chronic and disabling conditions, the partici-
pants reported that they felt they had "fallen through the cracks of the
health care system." 67 If all of the components are included, the regional
structures in Canada, unlike purchaser provider models, have the poten-
tial to eliminate the cracks experienced by individuals with disabilities.
Ontario is the only province to institute a purchaser provider model on
a limited basis. The recently established Community Care Access Cen-
tres (CCAC) carry responsibility for purchasing long term care and
community services, such as home care, for a defined geographic
population. 68 The CCACs have not been in operation for long enough to
make any statement about the impact on the Ontario system, but analysis
of the impact of the purchaser provider split in the U.K. suggests that the
success of the managed competition policy of the CCACs will rest on the
ability of the CCAC Boards to balance the evaluation of the softer
qualitative factors, such as quality of life and functional independence,
against the harder economic reality of the cost of service delivery.6 The
67. Thome .supra note 51 at 131.
68. Long-Term Care Act, S.O. 1994, c. 26.
69. A.P. Williams, S.G. Leggat & J. Barnsley, "Defining, measuring and assuring service
quality in community-based care: the case of long-term care reform in Ontario" (1997) at 5
[unpublished].
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CCAC model, with focus only on long-term and community based
service, has already created fragmentation of the services required by the
population with chronic and disabling conditions. The imposition of the
competitive focus of the purchaser provider split, which has been shown
to impede integration in the U.K., will likely result in further fragmenta-
tion of health services for people with disabilities.
Based on the review of the purchaser provider model in the U.K.,
CCACs in Ontario risk the creation of unequal access to long-term and
community services by the population with disabilities. Through the
British North America Act,7" responsibility for health care was assigned
to the provinces, and the Charter applies "to the legislature and govern-
ment of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the
legislature of each province." 7 As the supreme law of the country, the
Charter takes precedence over all other legislation. Changes in the
organization and delivery of health care services which result in inequi-
ties in access to individuals with disabilities may be seen to violate the
equality rights of the Charter. Under the Charter, "every individual is
equal before and under the law."72 As such, equality rights are intended
to protect the individual against discrimination, a guarantee which may
assist persons with disabilities as health care purchasing may focus on the
needs of the broader community at the expense of individuals with high
needs. The Canadian Bar Association Task Force suggested that health
care resource allocation decisions of physicians, hospitals, regional
health authorities and provincial health ministries may infringe s. 7 or
s. 15 of the Charter.
73
Section 7 of the Charter protects the right to life, liberty and security
of the person. An individual with disabilities could challenge a resource
allocation decision that results in decreased access to health care services
on the grounds that the decision denies his or her right to life, to liberty
or to security. In fact, a case in British Columbia held that when an
individual died while waiting for heart surgery, there was a violation of
the right to life.74 It has been suggested that "[w]hile it [the Charter] does
70. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3.
71. Charter, supra note 33,s. 32(1).
72. Charter, supra note 33, s. 15. Section 15(1) states:
"Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability".
73. Canadian Bar Association. Task Force on Health Care. What's Law Got to Do With It?
Health Care Reform in Canada (Ottawa: The Association, 1994).
74. Sallis v. Vancouver General Hospital [1996] B.C.J. No. 758 (B.C.S.C.) (QL).
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not give patients the right to demand any and all treatments, an argument
can be made that it protects them from undue state interference with
access to treatment. 75
The Supreme Court of Canada has found that an infringement of
s.15 requires:
1. that one of the four basic equality rights (e.g. equality before the law,
equality under the law,equal protection of the law, and equal benefit
of the law) be denied as a consequence of a legal distinction based
on the enumerated prohibited grounds of discrimination or analo-
gous grounds; and
2. that the denial results in discrimination in the sense of a burden,
obligation or disadvantage to, or the withholding or limiting of
benefits and advantages from, the claimant.76
This suggests that establishment of a provincial government health
program which results in an individual with disabilities having access to
health care which is less than that of the general public might be an
infringement of s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.
Recent studies have suggested that use of regional authorities to garner
public input on issues of rationing in health care may result in service
limitations for disadvantaged populations. Public input into financial
solutions for the health care system, either specifically through participa-
tion in the governance process or through consultative processes, has
shown that members of the general public assign low priority to services
for groups with high health care needs, 77 such as individuals with
disabilities. Although not a purchaser provider split, the move within the
Canadian system to involve the public in regional health system decision
making may result in a reallocation of funding away from needed health
services for people with disabilities. The purchaser provider model
establishes a resource allocation process which results in a conflict
between the rights of the presumed majority of citizens and the rights of
some needy patients in the purchase of services. Observers of system
change have identified the value conflicts generated with grassroots
public involvement in allocation decisions 78 where there is this ability to
75. Canadian Bar Association Task Force, supra note 73 at 50.
76. J.R. Sproat, Equality Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1996)
at 10-11.
77. See Lomas, supra note 45, and A. Bowling, B. Jacobson & L. Southgate, "Health service
priorities. Explorations in consultation of the public and health professionals on priority setting
in an inner London health district" (1993) 37 Soc. Sci. & Med. 851; C. Bowie, A. Richardson
& W. Sykes, "Consulting the public about health service priorities" (1995) 311 Br. Med. J.
1155.
78. Lewis, supra note 44.
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minimize the needs of some segments of the population. As illustrated
above, the needs assessment approach to allocation decisions is weighted
in favour of broader population needs. Generally, acute, highly techno-
logical life-saving medical interventions are seen as being more valuable
by regional populations. However, a health system which focuses fund-
ing predominantly on acute interventions will not be able to respond to the
objective of enabling people with disabilities to live an independent and
dignified life in the community for as long as they are able and wish to do
so, an objective that is a prime requirement of the goal of equalization of
opportunity.
The philosophy of independent living by the population with disabili-
ties favours solutions whereby individuals with disabilities are fully
integrated within the community. However, the needs of some individu-
als may be better served through targeted or segregated strategies. In
Eaton, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada illustrated
different approaches related to the issue of integration versus segregation.
The Court of Appeal suggested that segregation of a child with disabilities
in a special class for children with disabilities against the child's wishes
as expressed by the child's legal representatives, was discriminatory
within the meaning of s. 15(1) of the Charter.79 However, the Supreme
Court of Canada concluded that a segregated class would best meet the
needs of the child in question and that this could not be construed as a
violation of s.15. This suggests that a health care system has the oppor-
tunity to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities through both
targeted and mainstream programs, and that not all general health care
programs need to provide for the integration of individuals with disabili-
ties if their needs can be found to be met more appropriately through
segregated programs.
The commitment of Canadian society to equalization of opportunity
requires access to services that protect or restore function without
financial or other discriminatory barriers. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court of
Canada found that an insurance plan that offered different benefits for
physical and mental illness was discriminatory.s0 Sopinka J. wrote for the
majority: "thus, a finding of discrimination on the basis of disability,even
though only a subset of disabled employees is mistreated, is permissible
according to case law"."' This suggests that in evaluating the impact of
health care reforms, not only will the impact on individuals with disabili-
79. Eaton, supra note 12.
80. Gibbs, supra note 13 at 167.
81. Ibid.
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ties be compared with individuals without disabilities, but also the impact
on individuals with different types of disabilities will have to be assessed.
For example, a health authority which purchases physiotherapy services
for individuals who have suffered a stroke, but provides inferior physio-
therapy services for individuals who have multiple sclerosis, may be seen
to discriminate against that subset of individuals with disabilities who
have multiple sclerosis.
Conclusion
Although protected from discrimination by the Charter and human rights
legislation, people with disabilities may find that current supposed
reforms within the Canadian health care system reduce the ability of the
system to respond to their health care needs. The analysis of the impact
of the implementation of a purchaser provider model in the U.K. found
that the incentives within the system were not consistent with good health
care for individuals with chronic and disabling conditions.
Separating the purchase from the provision of health care does not
support equalization of opportunity for those with disabilities, as incon-
sistent purchasing and provision practices are adopted by different
regions. The purchaser provider model does not facilitate establishment
of the integrated delivery system required by individuals with chronic and
disabling conditions. As a mechanism to address the financial constraints
within the health system, a purchaser provider model has the potential to
result in inequitable rationing of services for disadvantaged populations
such as those with disabilities. Canadian provincial governments are
cautioned to identify and respect the needs of people with disabilities in
future health care reforms and to be vigilant about protecting their
entitlement to health care services in order to ensure that the tide of reform
does not leave people with disabilities further disadvantaged in its wake.
The authors suggest the following as a statement of principles to guide
the planning of health care reform in Canada in a manner which respects
the needs of persons with disabilities:
1. There must be evidence that the proposed reform strives to eliminate
systemic discrimination.
2. Provision for meaningful involvement of persons with disabilities in
the governance, planning and resource allocation activities must be
assured.
3 There must be a recognition of the need to be accountable to the
population with disabilities which is based upon a bio-social definition
of disability appropriate for the Canadian context.
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4. There must be evidence of the promotion of client independence,
respect for consumer choice and a process for ensuring the ongoing
evaluation of client satisfaction with services.
5. There should be opportunities for inclusion of both mainstream and
targeted approaches as required to meet the needs of persons with
disabilities.
